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Abstract 
This study estimates intergenerational correlations in mid-life wealth across three generations, and a 
young fourth generation, and examines how much of the parent-child association that can be explained 
by inheritances. Using a Swedish data set we find parent-child rank correlations of 0.3–0.4 and grand-
parents-grandchild rank correlations of 0.1–0.2. Conditional on parents’ wealth, grandparents’ wealth 
is weakly positively associated with grandchild’s wealth and the parent-child correlation is basically 
unchanged if we control for grandparents’ wealth. Bequests and gifts strikingly account for at least 50 
per cent of the parent-child wealth correlation while earnings and education are only able to explain 25 
per cent.  
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This paper studies the persistence of wealth status across multiple generations and how much 
of the intergenerational persistence that is driven by direct inheritances from parents to their 
children. A voluminous empirical literature has studied the intergenerational mobility of in-
comes (see Solon, 1999, and Black and Devereux, 2011, for surveys), but much less is known 
about the transmission of wealth from parents to their children and the mechanisms underly-
ing it.1 This lacuna is unfortunate for several reasons. First, as is evident from the literature on 
life-cycle bias (e.g., Haider and Solon, 2006), it is important to find more permanent measures 
of economic status than what is captured by yearly income measures. In fact, wealth may be a 
better proxy for long-term economic success than earnings or income as wealth reflects cumu-
lative net incomes. Second, there has been an increased interest in questions related to multi-
generational mobility in recent years (Solon, 2015). However, wealth has received very lim-
ited attention in this literature.2 Third, the importance of inherited wealth for economic ine-
quality has recently attracted much attention in the academic literature (e.g., Piketty, 2011, 
2014). One crucial yet largely overlooked aspect is to which extent inheritance also influences 
the inequality of opportunity in the wealth distribution as measured by the degree of persis-
tence of wealth status across generations. 
 
This paper has two main purposes. First, we estimate the persistence of wealth inequality 
across several generations. We have access to exceptional wealth data observed at mid-life for 
individuals in three generations and during childhood/early adulthood for individuals in the 
fourth generation, which enables us to perform intergenerational wealth mobility estimations 
across adjacent generations as well as across three and four generations. We build on a grow-
ing literature that investigates the importance of multigenerational effects and long-term so-
cial mobility using data on outcomes such as income, education and occupation. A prime 
finding in this literature is that grandparents provide additional information about grandchil-
dren’s outcomes, conditional on parent’s outcomes, and that long-run social mobility is slow-
                                                 
1 Among exceptions are Arrondel and Grange (2006), Charles and Hurst (2003), Menchik (1979) and Wahl 
(2002). There are also a few recent papers by Black et al. (2015), Boserup, Kopczuk and Kreiner (2014), 
Fagereng, Mogstad and Rønning (2015) and Pfeffer and Killewald (2015). The classical article on the theoretical 
underpinnings is Becker and Tomes (1979).  
2 There are some recent exceptions: Boserup et al. (2014), using population-wide high-quality administrative 
data from Denmark and Pfeffer and Killewald (2015), using survey data from PSID, both have access to wealth 
data for three generations. However, in both these studies, in their main analysis, wealth is measured when 
grandparents and parents are relatively young: grandchildren (parents) are 37 (35) years of age on average in 
Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) and 23 (35) on average in Boserup et al. (2014). Given life cycle considerations, 
this feature of their data sets will likely result in biased estimates of the associations between wealth of grand-
children and grandparents.  
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er than predicted from an estimate using data on parents and children.3 We follow the ap-
proach in earlier papers and estimate bivariate regression models of child’s wealth on ances-
tors’ wealth, as well as extend the standard first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) parent-child 
model by also including grandparents’, and in some specifications even great grandparents’, 
wealth in the regressions. These estimates constitute an improvement over earlier studies of 
long-term intergenerational wealth mobility in at least two regards: We are the first to esti-
mate models for three generations measuring wealth of middle-aged individuals. Moreover, 
we are the first to present any evidence on the transmission of ancestors’ wealth to the wealth 
of great grandchildren (although still young), where we are able to link families across gen-
erations through individual identifiers.4 
 
Our second contribution is to quantify the importance of transfers to the intergenerational per-
sistence in wealth. Bequests and gifts constitute an obvious channel through which wealth 
persistence arises across generations, but despite this there are few studies of how large a 
share of wealth mobility that can be attributed to these transfers.5 Using detailed information 
about inheritances, hand-collected from individual inheritance tax records and thus perfectly 
matched to both decedents and their heirs, we make two types of estimations. One adds inher-
itances to the intergenerational wealth model, and the other is based on a constructed “inher-
                                                 
3 This statement is based on findings from a number of recent papers studying different outcomes and data sets 
from different countries: In addition to the few references studying wealth listed in footnote 2, some additional 
studies are Adermon, Lindahl and Palme, 2016, (outcomes: education, earnings and occupation; country: Swe-
den), Braun and Stuhler, 2014, (education and occupation; Germany) Clark, 2014, (education and occupation; 
various countries); Lindahl et al. 2015, (education and earnings using the same data set as in this paper), Long 
and Ferrie, 2013, (occupation; U.S.); Modalsli, 2016, (occupation; Norway), Mollegaard and Jaeger, 2015 (edu-
cation and “cultural capital”; Denmark) and Olivetti, Paserman and Salisbury, 2016 (earnings; U.S.). For a sur-
vey that includes the older literature on multigenerational mobility, see Solon (2015). Recent theoretical contri-
butions by Solon (2014) and Stuhler (2013) discuss reasons for these empirical findings. 
4 As opposed to Clark and Cummins, 2014, who use (rare) surnames to form linkages between multiple genera-
tions. They find strong wealth associations between individuals and their (surname linked) ancestors. 
5 There are a few very recent studies touching on this question. Fagereng et al. (2015), studying wealth transmis-
sion among 2,265 Korean-born adoptees in Norway, find that the association in wealth between adopted children 
and their adopting parents are not driven by gifts, inter vivos transfers or inheritances. However, given that the 
parents are between 64 and 66 years of age, there are likely very few in the child generation that have actually 
received inheritances. Black et al. (2015), for Sweden (focusing on a sample of Swedish-born adoptees), and 
Boserup et al. (2016), using population-wide data for Denmark, both lack information on actual inheritances. 
Instead, they use the timing of death of the parent(s) to infer how the wealth transmission coefficient changes 
before and after the death of the parent(s). Both studies find a large increase in the wealth rank correlation after 
the death of parent(s). Pfeffer and Killewald (2015), for the US, find that the parent-child wealth estimate de-
creases with about 11 per cent when they add inheritances to the AR(1) model of parent’s and child’s wealth. 
The inheritances measure used is from a question in the PSID to respondents about large (above $10,000) inher-
itances received (28 per cent of the sample). Given that parent’s age on average is about 72 when inheritances 
are last measured, it is likely that the majority of children have at least one living parent, and hence that observed 
inheritances are very incomplete.  
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itance-free” measure of child wealth that draws on the information about the exact timing of 
wealth measurement and received inheritances in people’s life span. This analysis adheres to 
the recent literature on the importance of inherited wealth in society for different economic 
and distributional outcomes.6  
 
As our dataset contains measures of lifetime earnings and educational attainment for the first 
three generations, we are also able to further investigate the importance of human capital for 
the wealth transmissions across generations.  
 
We are able to generate a number of interesting findings. We find parent-child rank correla-
tions in the range of 0.3–0.4, which are larger than what has been found for other Scandinavi-
an countries. The parent-child rank correlation has, perhaps surprisingly, increased over time. 
Further, we find grandparents-grandchild rank correlations of 0.1–0.2, although there is a 
quite limited role for grandparents’ wealth, conditional on parents’ wealth. The parent-child 
correlation is basically unchanged if we control for grandparents’ wealth. Bequests and gifts 
account for more than 50 per cent of the parent-child wealth correlation while earnings and 
education together only explain about 25 per cent. 
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
1.1 Data and variables 
The dataset used in this study originates from a survey of all pupils in Malmö (the third larg-
est city in Sweden) conducted when they attended 3rd grade in 1938. The typical child in this 
“index generation” was born in 1928. Data were also collected for the parents. This included 
survey information on father’s occupation and parental earnings from tax registers for several 
years. A lot of effort was spent on collecting the parental information resulting in near-
complete coverage (above 95 per cent).7 It should be noted that the study population covers 
both the city of Malmö with suburbs and its agricultural surroundings, and this sample has 
                                                 
6 A number of studies have examined the aggregate macroeconomic importance of inherited wealth (Piketty, 
2011, 2014; Piketty and Zucman, 2014, 2015; Ohlsson, Roine, and Waldenström, 2014) whereas other studies 
study how inheritances affect the cross-sectional wealth distribution (see, e.g., Wolff and Gittleman, 2014 and 
Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström, 2016, for two recent examples). 
7 The material was originally collected by Siver Hallgren and developed by Torsten Husén. Hallgren (1939) is 
the first study published using this data set. See also de Wolff and Slijp (1973), Palme and Sandgren (2008) and 
Lindahl et al. (2015) for further description of the Malmö study data set. 
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been shown to be very representative of the whole Swedish population at this time. For exam-
ple, Lindahl et al. (2015) show that the distributions in education and earnings are very similar 
for descendants of those in the original sample compared to the population of Swedes. If we 
compare the cross-sectional distribution of wealth in our study population and the total Swe-
dish population, documented by Roine and Waldenström (2009), trends appear to be roughly 
the same (inequality falls after the 1940s and stabilize from the 1970s onwards) but the level 
of inequality is clearly higher in Malmö than in the country as a whole.  
 
Information about spouses has been added later, including information about dates of birth 
and death, earnings histories and educational attainments, all drawn from high-quality admin-
istrative registers. The result is a dataset consisting of information on up to four generations of 
the same families, where the great-grandparents were typically born in the late nineteenth 
century and the great-grandchildren typically finished their education in the early twenty-first 
century. Because of the excellent quality of the Swedish registers, it has also been possible to 
add information for most of the descendants. For example, if they have moved away from 
Malmö but stayed in Sweden, they are included in the data set.8  
 
For the purpose of this study, we have extended the dataset by adding detailed information 
about personal wealth and inheritances. Our data on wealth are collected from official admin-
istrative records. For all generations we observe tax-register wealth and for the two first gen-
erations we also observe wealth at death reported in estate inventory reports. Data on taxable 
wealth, wealth at death and inheritances for the first two generations were collected manually 
by us from tax registers stored in county archives. Because of the limited coverage of estate 
wealth for the second generation and inheritances received for the third generation, we do not 
use this information in the analysis.9  
 
The definitions of assets, liabilities and net wealth are in principle the same for all generations 
and across the wealth tax records and the estate inventory reports. Non-financial assets in-
clude housing, urban and agricultural land and to some degree various kinds of valuables 
(consumer durables, antiquities, art etc.); financial assets include bank deposits and cash, 
                                                 
8 Regarding the issue of mobility, we note that in 1993, 38 per cent of the third and fourth generations still lived 
in Malmö, an additional 31 per cent lived elsewhere in the county where Malmö is situated, 8 per cent lived in 
the county of Stockholm, and the rest were quite evenly spread out in the rest of Sweden (Lindahl et al., 2015). 
9 The limited coverage is because only about one-third of the parents in the second generation have died at the 
end of our sample window. 
 6
stocks (listed and non-listed), some insurance savings and miscellaneous private claims; lia-
bilities include private loans (mainly mortgages) and student loans from state institutions. 
Some items are better covered in the estate inventory reports: for assets the net life insurance 
proceeds and consumer durables, and for liabilities funeral expenses, executor’s commission, 
attorney fees and taxes paid (primarily capital gains taxes).10 For the first two generations 
assets are reported in tax-assessed values which are generally (but not always) lower than 
current market values.11 For more details on the wealth data, we refer to Appendix A. 
 
The first generation’s wealth measure is based on observed taxable wealth in 1945 and 1952, 
which is thus measured around the age of 48 and 55. Some measurement issues warrant spe-
cific attention. For both years, wealth is bottom-coded, and especially so for 1952 when we 
only observe wealth for the wealthiest eight per cent of the population. For 1945 we observe 
all positive wealth holders, as long as positive wealth is indicated in the tax registers.12 Hence, 
the left censoring for the 1945 measure consists of those with around zero or negative wealth. 
We observe roughly the top 40 per cent of the families to have positive wealth in 1945. This 
implies that for most of the first-generation sample we only use wealth in 1945. While such 
small coverage is problematic, it should be noted that the top tenth of the wealth distribution 
holds a sizeable share of total net wealth; looking at Sweden as a whole, the richest wealth 
decile held 83 per cent of all wealth in 1945 and 75 per cent in 1951 (Roine and Waldenström, 
2009). In our empirical analysis, moreover, we present top decile regressions that circumvent 
much of the coverage problem. In section 2, we further examine if the different measurement 
issues of the first-generation wealth variable influence the results. Specifically, we impute 
wealth for the bottom-censored observations as well as using two alternative wealth measures: 
“capitalized wealth” from a secondary source,13 and “estate wealth” (i.e., wealth at death 
                                                 
10 A public investigation of private wealth in 1967 found when comparing estate inventory reports with the pre-
vious year’s wealth tax returns of the deceased persons that personal assets (i.e., durables) and debts were much 
better covered in the estate inventory reports (SOU 1969, p. 276). See Henrekson and Waldenström (2016) for 
further descriptions of the Swedish inheritance taxation and the structure of estate inventory reports. 
11 Before World War II tax-assessed values were generally aimed at being equal to market values, but in the 
postwar era they have mostly been set with a discount: real estate was valued at 75 per cent of market value and 
listed stock values have also been set at lower than market values. 
12 The lowest observed wealth amount is 900 SEK in 1945 (about 15,000 SEK today which is equal to about 
1,500 euro) and 2,900 SEK in 1952 (about 40,000 SEK or 4,000 euro). 
13 This alternative wealth measure, “capitalized wealth”, divides tax-reported capital earnings (interest and divi-
dend earnings) in 1937 (only men) and 1945 and 1952 (both men and women) by an assumed real rate of return 
of three per cent and then averages across all three years. Capitalized wealth differs from taxable wealth by dis-
regarding all the assets that do not yield taxable cash returns, notably most types of real estate and land but also 
some financial assets, but to the extent that ownership of cash-yielding financial assets and total wealth is posi-
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which is not bottom coded). Our conclusion from these sensitivity tests is that measurement 
error is surprisingly low and hence that the estimates where we include first generation wealth 
are not severely biased.  
 
The second generation’s wealth is based on taxable wealth observed in the administrative 
registers during the years 1985, 1988 and 1991 (thus measured at ages 57–63).14 Notable is 
that wealth in the first two of these years is censored from below at zero whereas this is not 
the case for 1991, the reason being different reporting routines at the tax authority after the 
Swedish tax reform of 1990–1991. The third generation’s wealth is measured in 1999 and 
2006 (thus around ages 42–49) in Statistics Sweden’s wealth register, and the fourth genera-
tion’s wealth is measured in 2006 (around age 20). Unlike the taxable wealth reported on tax 
returns that we use for the first two generations, the wealth-register data combine property tax 
data on non-financial assets with third-party (banks and financial intermediaries) reported 
statements on financial assets and liabilities. Note that the fourth generation is very young 
compared to the first three generations when we observe wealth and we therefore analyse 
their intergenerational outcomes separately from the main analysis.  
 
Our preferred wealth measures for these four generations are constructed by averaging tax 
wealth (in 2010 prices) over the years available for each individual, using only non-missing 
years. In the estimations we always use the sum of wealth across parents, grandparents, and 
great grandparents, respectively, (“family wealth” for each ancestor generation) and individu-
al wealth for the child generation.  
 
Estate wealth, or terminal wealth, of the deceased in the first and second generations is ob-
served in estate inventory reports which are filed for all individuals with some wealth hold-
ings.15 Since estate inventories are always filed individually while we wish to measure the 
                                                                                                                                                        
tively correlated they can be expected to capture the same structures of intergenerational transmission studied 
here. 
14 Included in the wealth measure for 1985 and 1988 is the tax value of real estate, which is 75 per cent of market 
value. Because we also have separate information on real estate tax value, we can scale this up to market value 
and add the difference to the wealth measure. This reduces the number of zero (censored) observations by 
around 10 percentage points. Regressions using this alternative definition of wealth produces results similar to 
our main analysis (see Online Appendix Table 1, Panel A).  
15 These data were collected manually from county archives all over Sweden where the individuals had died until 
2001, when the Swedish tax authority took over the responsibility for storing all the country’s estate inventory 
reports. Some of the deceased in our sample do not have estate inventory reports. This is primarily due to the 
insignificance of their wealth, in which case only a so-called estate notification (“dödsboanmälan”) was filed.  
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joint parental wealth at death, we need to combine the value of two estates recorded at differ-
ent points in time. In order to measure the joint parental estate wealth that accounts for the 
differential times of death and potential inter-spousal transfers from the first deceased parent 
to the remaining parent, we follow previous wealth mobility literature using estate wealth data 
(see Menchik, 1979; Wahl, 2002) and construct a specific measure, the peak midparent 
wealth, which is equal to ½ ∙ ሺݓி௜௥௦௧	ௗ௘௖௘௔௦௘ௗ ൅ max	ሺݓௌ௘௖௢௡ௗ	ௗ௘௖௘௔௦௘ௗ, 0ሻሻ.  
 
Inheritances are the value of bequests from parents at death to their children in the second 
generations.16 The inheritance lot of each heir was calculated and reported by the tax authori-
ties in inheritance tax records (“arvsskattestegar”), which were then attached to each deceased 
individual’s estate inventory report. Because of the tax purpose, these inheritance lots were 
based on a close scrutiny of the probated wealth, accounting for wills if they existed and ac-
counting for taxable inter vivos gifts made within ten years of the testator’s death. Note that 
because of this source of inheritance information, we can observe exactly when inheritances 
were received. Combined with the fact that we observe this information for a very large frac-
tion of the sample, our study makes a unique contribution to the understanding of how inher-
itances influence the intergenerational transmission of wealth. 
 
Finally, we also have access to data on education for all four generations and earnings histo-
ries for the first three generations. We derive measures of years of schooling and log lifetime 
earnings in a similar way as in Lindahl et al. (2015).17 Just like for wealth, residualised earn-
ings and years of schooling are averaged across ancestors for grandparents and for great 
grandparents. For more details on the education and earnings data, we refer to Appendix B. 
1.2 Sample restrictions and descriptive statistics  
Our dataset is based on 1,542 individuals in the “index generation”, which is the original pop-
ulation studied in the 1930s and the second generation in our multi-generational panel. Of 
these, 1,491 have at least one parent present in the data. Wealth is observed for at least one 
                                                 
16 We do not include inheritances from others than the parents, i.e., siblings, other relatives or non-relatives. But 
as Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström (2016) show for Sweden and Wolff and Gittleman (2014) show for the 
U.S., that almost two thirds of inheritances received come from parents. 
17 A few differences are that we, to improve comparability with our wealth measures, use family earnings instead 
of father’s earnings and that we use average years of schooling for parents. We also note that i) for the first gen-
eration, the education measure is only available for the fathers and is derived from information on occupation, 
and ii) earnings in the first generation is for 4 out of 5 years only available as the sum of labor earnings and capi-
tal earnings. 
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parent for 1,291 individuals in the index generation, and own wealth for 1,356 individuals. 
For 1,147 of these we observe both own and parental wealth, and this is our main analysis 
sample for the index generation. For the third and fourth generations we use as many observa-
tions as we can, given that they are descendants of these 1,147 individuals and that they are 
observed in the wealth registers (true for almost all individuals). This results in 2,100 individ-
uals and 3,755 individuals, respectively, in the third and fourth generation.18 The sample for 
which we have access to estate wealth is slightly smaller (1,093 individuals in the first genera-
tion), and we observe inheritances given from the first generation for 809 individuals. These 
are the samples for which we show descriptive statistics in Tables 1a and 1b.19 
 
[Tables 1a and 1b about here] 
 
Table 1a reports descriptive statistics for our wealth variables for the individuals used in the 
estimations in this study. We present statistics for wealth for all four generations, estate 
wealth for generation one and two, and inheritances for generation two, in addition to the oth-
er variables used in the estimations. We show means and standard deviations (the first col-
umn) as well as various percentiles. All wealth and earnings measures are presented in thou-
sands of SEK in 2010 prices (1 USD = 6.85 SEK in December 2010). Since we always use 
family wealth for ancestors’ and individuals’ wealth for descendants in our regressions, we 
show summary statistics separately for the second, third and fourth generation samples. 
 
Looking first at the main wealth measures, we see that mean wealth more than doubled be-
tween the first and second generations (from 182 to 446 thousand SEK), but grew at an even 
higher rate between the second and third generations (from 446 to 1,609 thousand SEK). This 
is partly explained by the switch from using tax-assessed values to market values. Because we 
measure the wealth of the fourth generation at a much younger age (19 on average) than for 
the earlier generations, they have an average wealth of only 103 thousand SEK, which should 
be compared to the individual wealth levels for the second generation (255 thousand SEK) 
and the third generation (705 thousand SEK). It is also worth noting that wealth is more even-
ly distributed among the later generations compared to the first, where most people have zero 
                                                 
18 If we lessen this descendant requirement, meaning that we do not require that we observe wealth for grandpar-
ents, we can observe wealth for 2,579 individuals in the third generation and wealth for 4,592 individuals in the 
fourth generation. The estimated intergenerational rank-rank correlations are very similar for this larger sample. 
19 Summary statistics for the corresponding percentile ranked variables, which we use in the actual estimations, 
are shown in the Online Appendix Table 2. 
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wealth, so that the mean is driven by a smaller subset of relatively wealthy individuals. In 
subsequent generations a majority of individuals have positive wealth.20 Wealth inequality 
appears fairly stable between the second and third generations, but is much higher in the 
younger fourth generation.21 Unlike taxable wealth, the estate wealth is not left-censored. Es-
tate wealth is positive for most of the individuals in the first generation (only 10 per cent has 
zero or negative values). Inheritances are substantial in relation to own wealth, which repre-
sents a first indication that this is likely to be an important channel for intergenerational 
wealth correlations. 
 
Table 1b presents means and standard deviations for (residualised) earnings for the first three 
generations, year of death for the first two generations, and educational attainment and year of 
birth for all four generations. In the first generation, almost everyone has died, with an aver-
age age at death of 75.2. For the first generation, because wealth data is missing for many 
women, only around a third of the sample is female.22 Subsequent generations are virtually 
balanced on gender, since we observe wealth for almost everyone in these generations. Note 
that earnings and schooling are missing for a few individuals for which we have wealth ob-
servations.  
2. Wealth transmission across two, three and four generations 
2.1 Graphical evidence and measurement issues 
We start the empirical analysis by showing graphical evidence for the wealth relationship 
across the distribution. Figure 1 displays kernel regressions of children’s wealth rank on their 
ancestors’ wealth rank.23 In each graph, the solid line shows the kernel regression estimate, 
                                                 
20 For the second, third and fourth generations, there are people with negative net wealth whereas no cases with 
negative net wealth are reported for the first generation for tax-administrative reasons, as we mentioned above. 
To make sure that this censoring of the first-generation wealth does not affect our findings we run sensitivity 
checks where we homogenize the wealth variables by censoring all of them from below at zero (see Online Ap-
pendix Table 1, Panel B). 
21 Using the individual level data, the P90/P50 ratios are 5.52 and 5.72, respectively, for the second and third 
generations and 18.6 for the fourth generation. Note that because two of the three years used to calculate wealth 
for the second generation are censored from below at zero, it is hard to compare the full distributions between 
generations. 
22 This is still an advantage compared to Lindahl et al. (2015) where we only observed earnings for fathers in the 
first generation and for men in subsequent generations.  
23 Chetty et al. (2014) show figures plotting average child rank on the y-axis against parental wealth percentile. 
That approach corresponds to estimating a local constant kernel regression using a rectangular kernel and a 
bandwidth of 1. Our approach uses a more efficient local linear kernel regression with an Epanechnikov kernel, 
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grey lines along the bottom are rug plots showing the density of the data while the dashed line 
indicates the best linear fit from a bivariate regression (to be discussed further below).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The association between parent and child wealth is quite well approximated by a linear speci-
fication, with the kernel almost tangent over most of the support in the parental wealth distri-
bution. In the tails, however, there are deviations; in all parent-child graphs (a, b and d) there 
is an increase in the slope around the parental top decile group and in panels b and d there 
seems to be a flat slope over the bottom decile group. Looking at the role of grandparent 
wealth in panels c and e, the overall correlation is, as expected, smaller but otherwise very 
similar to that of parental wealth showing a largely linear association that becomes steeper at 
the top. Finally, panel f shows the regression of the fourth generation on their great grandpar-
ents. Here, the overall correlation is very flat but once again has a steeper slope in the top.24 
The linear intergenerational association in wealth with stronger transmission in the top decile 
and sometimes lower in the bottom deciles is similar to findings in previous studies, in partic-
ular the results for Denmark by Boserup et al. (2014) and for Sweden by Black et al. (2015).  
 
We proceed to present two types of main estimations. The first is rank-rank correlations (the 
slope of the lines shown in the figures), which has the advantages of allowing for observations 
with zero wealth and to be less sensitive to outliers, and which have been used in several re-
cent papers on intergenerational income and wealth transmission (e.g., Chetty et al., 2014; 
Boserup et al., 2014). Because of the non-linearity at the top of the distribution, and the bot-
tom censoring for first generation wealth, we also present results from a second model, top 
decile regressions, in which we transform wealth into a binary variable taking the value one 
for the top 10 per cent of the wealth holders in each generation. We choose top decile25 be-
cause this is where we, approximately, observe a steeper slope (see Figure 1) and because we 
                                                                                                                                                        
which is specifically important given our smaller sample size. Note also that the variables have been residualised 
by regressing out birth cohort group dummies for both generations (see section 2.2), and the residuals have been 
rescaled to have the same range as the original percentile ranked variables. 
24 It should be noted that because of the large number of observations with zero wealth in the first generation (see 
table 1a), there is a mass point close to the bottom of the distribution and relatively large confidence intervals in 
this domain. This results in a set of spikes in the rank assigned, where the spikes will be determined by the frac-
tion of zeros (within birth cohort groups). This is why the lines stop at around the 25th percentile in figures 1a, 
1c and 1f. This calls for some caution in interpreting the patterns in the left part of the figures.  
25 Results are qualitatively similar if instead we use an indicator for the top 15 per cent or for the top five per 
cent – see Online Appendix Table 3. 
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have the advantage of having continuous wealth measures from two separate years at the top 
of the wealth distribution for the first generation (hence minimizing measurement error con-
cerns when assigning observations to the top decile of the wealth distribution).  
 
An advantage with the rank-rank and top decile regressions, compared to many alternative 
transformations, is that mismeasurement of the zero wealth observations does not matter as 
long as they are ranked correctly. This is important since about 61 per cent of the observations 
in the first generation have no wealth reported. If we instead use log wealth, we throw away 
over 60 per cent of the families in the first generation (and about 18 per cent in the second 
generation) and would is in effect estimate intergenerational associations for only about one-
third of the sample, all located in top of the wealth distribution. If we, in order to increase the 
sample for which we can use logs, recode those with zero wealth to having some small 
wealth, our regression estimates are extremely sensitive to small variations in that wealth 
amount. An alternative that is sometimes used instead of logs is the inverse hyperbolic sine 
(IHS) transformation, which can be used in the presence of zero and negative observations 
(Pence, 2006). Unfortunately, the IHS transformation turns out to be sensitive to very small 
deviations from zero, and is thus not suitable in the presence of bottom censoring. We there-
fore settle for estimating rank-rank correlations and top decile regressions in our main estima-
tions. In a complementary analysis we show results using alternative wealth measures for the 
first generation: capitalised wealth, estate wealth (which is not censored) and a wealth meas-
ure where we have imputed the bottom coded observations using information on education 
and total earnings (including capital income).  
2.2 Regression results for the first three generations 
Our baseline regression estimations are based on the following linear equation: 
  
(1)  ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵݓ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙଶݓ௜௧ିଶ ൅ ݁௜௧, 
 
where ݓ௜௧ is wealth of child ݅ and ݓ௜௧ି௝ is wealth of the parents (݆ ൌ 1) and the grandparents 
(݆ ൌ 2). We use individual wealth for the child generation and family wealth for the parent 
and grandparent generations. In our main regressions we use wealth measures scaled in per-
centile ranks, grouped by birth year, which means that the estimates can be interpreted as rank 
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correlations.26 All regressions include corresponding birth cohort group dummies. As men-
tioned above, we also estimate equation (1) as a linear probability model using indicators for 
belonging to the top wealth decile as dependent and explanatory variables. A coefficient from 
this regression measures the conditional probability of being in the top wealth decile given 
that your parents or grandparents were in the top wealth decile. Under perfect mobility, this 
probability would be 10 per cent.  
 
 
Table 2 presents the baseline results. Beginning with Panel A, columns 1 and 2 show two-
generational rank correlations (with ߙଶ ൌ 0 in equation 1). A primary result is that there is a 
relatively strong wealth correlation: 0.30 between first and second generations and 0.39 be-
tween second and third generations. A second finding is that the wealth rank correlation ap-
pears to have increased over time and the difference is statistically significant. Columns 3 and 
4 show three-generational rank correlations. Column 3 presents the rank correlation between 
the wealth of children and their grandparents (ߙଵ ൌ 0). The estimate is 0.17 and highly signif-
icant, which amounts to about 40 per cent of the rank-rank correlation for parents and children 
in column 2. 27 Column 4 shows results from estimation of AR(2) regressions. Parents’ wealth 
is basically unaffected by including grandparent wealth and grandparent wealth has a positive 
(0.04) but imprecisely estimated effect on a person’s wealth status (ݐ ൌ	1.37). 
 
Panel B’s top decile regressions typically show smaller correlations than in Panel A, but the 
overall pattern is the same.28 This is an early indication that the bottom-censoring of the first 
generation’s wealth is not worrisome (we discuss this issue further below). Persistence in the 
top is quite small in the second generation, with an estimate of 0.18, but relatively high in the 
third generation with an estimate of 0.34 which is more than three times higher than under 
perfect mobility. Estimating the relationship between children and grandparents we find that 
                                                 
26 Because of our limited sample size, it is not feasible to rank by birth cohort. Instead, we group birth cohorts so 
that each group has at least around 100 observations. While most such groups cover at most two or three cohorts, 
some groups in the tails span more cohorts (because the index generation is born in or around 1928, birth years 
follow a single-peaked distribution in our data set). To check if this affects results, we have tried dropping these 
tail groups entirely from the analysis, and results are mostly unchanged. We have also tried increasing group size 
to contain around 200 observations, and again results are mostly unchanged. 
27 It should be noted that in the main regressions (in this paper and also for earnings in Lindahl et al., 2015) not 
all observations represent unbroken family lines. For example, it could be that we observe wealth for a person’s 
father and maternal grandfather, but not for their paternal grandfather. When we restrict the sample to only un-
broken family lines, the grandparent-grandchild correlation is 0.136 (see Online Appendix Table 4). 
28 To say that they are smaller is a bit misleading, since the range from perfect mobility to perfect immobility is 
smaller for the top decile regression compared to the OLS regressions: in the top decile regressions, 0.10 is per-
fect mobility and 1.00 is perfect immobility, which should be compared to 0.00 and 1.00 in the OLS regressions.  
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the persistence at the top is 15 per cent, which amounts to 45 per cent of the persistence be-
tween these children and their parents (column 2). When we estimate the most general version 
of equation (1), we again see that parents’ wealth is, again, basically unaffected by including 
grandparents’ wealth. However, grandparents’ wealth has a positive estimated effect on a per-
son’s wealth status, which is now a bit more precisely estimated (ݐ ൌ	1.79).29 Hence, we con-
clude that grandparents’ wealth matters at the top of the distribution, even when we control 
for parents’ wealth.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
2.2.1 Does measurement error in the first generation’s wealth matter? 
The first generation’s wealth in 1945 and 1952 are bottom-coded as described above. When 
correlating wealth across these two years, the “raw” wealth including all the zeroes has a cor-
relation of approximately 0.30 whereas only using the top group observed in 1952 (and in 
most cases also in 1945) the correlation is high, well above 0.9. In other words, wealth seems 
to be measured consistently over time and using both these years should therefore decrease 
the measurement error in the top decile measure significantly, which means that our top decile 
regression estimates are unlikely to be biased by measurement error.  
 
The impact of measurement error due to the bottom coding could be more important, especial-
ly for the rank-rank correlations reported in columns 1, 2 and 4 of Table 3, Panel A. We test 
this in two ways.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
29 As expected from the figures and the estimates shown in Table 2, there are some non-linearities present that 
result in larger estimates at the top of the distribution. We show elasticities and rank correlations estimates in 
Online Appendix Table 5 (panels D and E) for the sample with positive wealth amounts (about one third of the 
three generation sample), where we find that child-grandparent wealth estimates (whether or not we are control-
ling for parents’ wealth) are larger than the rank correlations for the full sample in panel A of Table 2, but more 
in line with the top decile regression in Panel B. Interestingly, the elasticities and rank correlations, for the 
smaller sample with positive wealth, are similar regardless of whether we estimate elasticities or rank correla-
tions. Hence, it is the selected sample, not whether we use ranks or logs, that explain these results. In Panels A–C 
we also show the sensitivity of the results when we us the IHS transformed wealth variables - even very small 
variations in the bottom coded values (making minor adjustments to everyone in the first generation with exactly 
zero wealth, by giving tiny amounts (10 or 1000 Swedish kronors, equivalent to 1 or 100 Euros, respectively)), 
can have enormous effects on the estimates.  
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First, we rerun the main specification from Table 2 but instead use four alternative measures 
of first-generation wealth: 1) “capitalized wealth”, which is average taxed capital income in 
1937, 1945 and 1952 divided by a real rate of return, 2) “estate wealth” covering the whole 
distribution of wealth, but measured at the end of life for individuals in the first generation,30 
3) “imputed wealth”, which contains values for the many bottom-coded observations in our 
main measure imputed using family total earnings (including capital income) and years of 
schooling.31 The results in Table 3 show that all these alternative measures generate results 
very similar to the baseline findings above. 32 Transmission of parental wealth is large and 
significant for both the second and third generations, though clearly higher in the latter case 
underlining the possibility of a downward time trend in wealth mobility. Grandparental wealth 
is significantly positive when included on its own, but statistically insignificant when parental 
wealth is also included. The notably smaller grandparental estimate in Panel B’s column 4 is 
likely due to the fact that estate wealth is highly correlated with inheritance which is typically 
not transferred to grandchildren.33 We show kernel regressions of children’s wealth rank on 
their parents’ and grandparents’ rank for the various measures (corresponding to Figure 1) in 
Online Appendix Figure 1. 
 
The second test is to impose bottom-censoring on second generation wealth at the same place 
(around the 60th percentile) as for first generation wealth, and re-estimate the rank-rank 
wealth correlation between the third and second generation, using censored second generation 
wealth measure. The resulting estimate increases to 0.44, which thus suggests that the in-
crease over time is even more pronounced. If we then impute the second generation wealth 
measure, and use that measure in the estimations, the estimate becomes 0.39, which is very 
close to the actual estimate in column 2 of table 2.34 Hence, imputation works extremely well, 
which gives a lot of credibility to our estimates involving first generation wealth in Panel C of 
Table 3.  
                                                 
30 The rank correlation between “capitalized wealth” and “estate wealth” is 0.48 and the rank correlation with the 
main wealth measure is 0.60 for capitalized wealth and 0.52 for estate wealth. Hence, all these measures, alt-
hough clearly related, contain a lot of independent information.  
31 Imputation is based on estimating a Tobit regression and predicting wealth ranks for the censored observa-
tions. We perform bootstrap imputation with 1000 draws to account for the uncertainty in the prediction step. 
Correlations with the main wealth measure is 0.35 for earnings and 0.20 for years of schooling.  
32 We decided not to use one of the measures as instrument for another, because two of the measures capture 
different aspects of wealth (the capitalized and estate wealth measures) and because the imputed measure is 
partly determined by education and earnings which are unlikely to be excludable in the second stage. 
33 If we impute the bottom coded wealth observations with the rank based on estate wealth we obtain very simi-
lar results as reported in Panel A of table 2 (see Online Appendix Table 1, Panel C).  
34 See Online Appendix Table 6.  
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Based on these additional results we conclude that measurement error in the first generation 
wealth measure does not alter the conclusions from our main regressions. 
2.2.2 Summarizing the findings from the three generation regressions 
Let us briefly summarize the central results from the three-generation regressions and relate 
them to findings in the literature. There is a relatively strong wealth correlation: it is 0.30 be-
tween the first and second generations and 0.39 between the second and third generations. 
The latter estimate can be compared to recent estimates of rank correlations in wealth for 
Scandinavian countries and the U.S.: It is clearly larger than the ones reported for Denmark in 
Boserup et al. (2014) and for Norway in Fagereng et al. (2015), slightly larger than the one 
reported for Sweden in Black et al. (2015), and very similar to the estimate reported in Pfeffer 
and Killewald (2015) using U.S. survey data from the PSID. An earlier well known study by 
Charles and Hurst (2003) also used PSID data and found a similar sized wealth elasticity of 
about 0.36. Because of bottom coding of first generation wealth, we are not able to credibly 
estimate wealth elasticities connecting the second and first generation. However, the wealth 
elasticity between the third and second generation is 0.32 in our data (݊ ൌ 1,609 or about 75 
per cent of the total sample), so only somewhat lower than our wealth rank correlation of 
0.39.35  
 
The wealth rank correlation has increased over time and the difference is statistically signifi-
cant. This is a somewhat surprising finding given that Lindahl et al. (2015), using the same 
data set as in this paper, did not find this to be the case for schooling and earnings.36 The 
mechanisms for wealth transmission may be different from those for schooling and earnings, 
and the importance of these various mechanisms can also have evolved differently over time. 
As we show below (section 5) the importance of schooling and earnings in explaining wealth 
transmission across generations has not changed over time. Although we rule out measure-
ment issues related to bottom coding in the previous subsection as an explanation for this 
trend, it should still be remembered that the wealth measures are not exactly comparable 
                                                 
35 The difference compared to our rank correlation appears to be driven entirely by sample selection as the rank 
wealth correlation is 0.29 using this sample of	݊ ൌ 1,609.  
36 When we compare results with Lindahl et al. (2015) we always use the standardized coefficient estimates 
(Mean=0 ; SD=1) reported in that paper. 
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across generations (se section 1.1) and that the sampling of the data set is such that compari-
sons of intergenerational estimates over time is not straightforward.37  
 
Another central finding is that grandparents’ wealth has a positive but imprecisely estimated 
effect on a person’s wealth status, conditional on parental wealth. Both Boserup et al. (2014) 
for Denmark and Pfeffer and Killewald (2015) for the U.S. are also able to estimate AR(2) 
models for wealth and find quite large grandparental wealth effects, conditional on parents’ 
wealth. The conditional grandparental estimate is 72 per cent of the unconditional estimate in 
Boserup et al. and 49 per cent in Pfeffer and Killewald, whereas in our study it is 25 per cent 
(the OLS estimates reported in Panel A of Table 2) or 40 per cent (the top decile regressions 
in Panel B). However, the parents and children are quite young in both these studies, which 
indicate a larger role for grandparents because grandparents are more important in the young-
er life of parents and grandchildren and because measuring wealth of parents in their 30s will 
not accurately measure their mid-life wealth. As the grandparents are relatively older (47 in 
Boserup et al. and 62 in Pfeffer and Killewald) wealth for them are measured more correctly 
and will therefore capture some of that missed variation. The importance of grandparents’ 
wealth will thus be overestimated and that of parent’s wealth will be underestimated. Howev-
er, we note that a 95% C.I. around our main estimate for grandparental wealth do cover the 
main estimate in Pfeffer and Killewald and also cover an estimate in Boserup et al. when they 
instead use an older sample.38 How do these results match those reported in Lindahl et al 
(2015), where the AR(1) model was rejected for schooling and (marginally) for earnings? As 
it turns out, our results for wealth are not statistically different from those for earnings, partly 
due to the poor precision of the estimated coefficients for grandparents in the AR(2)-model 
for both these outcomes.39  
 
                                                 
37 As explained in section 1, the data set is based on the population of 6th graders attending schools in Malmö in 
1938. This second generation (and their parents) is therefore representative of the population of 6th graders in 
Malmö at that time. However, the third generation are descendants of these individuals, and hence not necessari-
ly representative of the population of 6th graders in Malmö at that later time (they can for instance have relocat-
ed to other parts of Sweden whereas immigrating families to Malmö is not represented).  
38 The conditional grandparental coefficient estimate decreases slightly (by 22 percent) in an AR(2) regression in 
Boserup et al. (2014) when they instead use an older sample (but that suffers from potential selection issues). 
39 To estimate the grandparental wealth association in the AR(2)-model precisely enough to draw strong conclu-
sions clearly requires more data. Note that Lindahl et al. (2015), in their AR(2) regressions, found standardized 
conditional grandparent estimates [95 per cent C.I.] of 0.110 [0.054, 0.166] for years of schooling and 0.064 [-
0.004, 0.132] for earnings, whereas for wealth we find 0.041 [-0.019, 0.101] using the same generations. Hence, 
trivial effects can be ruled out only for schooling, and large effects can’t be ruled out for any of the outcomes. 
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Clark (2012) and Clark and Cummins (2014) propose a simple model of the evolvement of 
wealth over time, where the parameter “long-run intergenerational persistence in social sta-
tus” is estimable using data on at least three generations (see Appendix C). If we calculate this 
parameter using the data in this paper, we get an estimate equal to 0.48 for wealth, which 
should be compared to 0.49 for earnings and 0.71 for schooling using the estimates in Lindahl 
et al. (2015). Comparing these long-run estimates to the bivariate estimates using data on two 
generations, we conclude that long-run intergenerational mobility is somewhat overstated 
using data on only two generations for wealth.40  
 
Lastly, and as a consequence of the prior reasoning, the parent-child wealth rank correlation is 
unaffected if we control for grandparents’ wealth. Hence, even though grandparents’ wealth is 
quite predictive of grandchild’s wealth, we must conclude that most of this link appears to be 
mediated by parent’s wealth. We note that, similar to wealth in this study, Lindahl et al. 
(2015) also found that the parent-child estimates were not much affected by controlling for 
grandparents’ outcomes (the estimate was somewhat lower for schooling but very similar for 
earnings). This is also a rationale for why we focus on the parent-child estimates when we 
later turn to investigating mechanisms. 
2.3  Wealth persistence across four generations 
The long-run reach of our dataset allows us to estimate wealth regression models using indi-
viduals from four consecutive generations, which appears to be a unique contribution to the 
literature. The fourth generation in our dataset is made up of children, adolescents or young 
adults, making this a sample of individuals who themselves have had no, or very little, time to 
acquire wealth. Hence, as mechanisms differ, compared to intergenerational associations us-
ing mid-life wealth for all generations, we should be careful in comparing the results here 
with those in the previous sections.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of the four-generation regressions. The parental wealth-rank cor-
relation in column 1 of Panel A is high, about 0.39, which is very similar to estimates for the 
third and second generations. However, columns 2 and 3 indicate a fairly strong direct associ-
ation with grandparental and great grandparental wealth. In the case of grandparental wealth, 
                                                 
40 The average of the 2 generation wealth estimates in panel B of Table 2 is 0.34, whereas they are 0.32 for 
schooling and 0.29 for earnings using the estimates reported in Lindahl et al. (2015).  
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this association holds even when conditioning on the wealth of parents, a pattern that was not 
as clear for generations 1–3 in Table 2. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Splitting the fourth generation into samples below (Panel B) and above age 18 (Panel C), we 
see that the multigenerational associations appear to be driven by very young children. Since 
most of them have not been able to accumulate their own wealth and only very few have re-
ceived inheritances, we interpret these high associations as primarily driven by various kinds 
of inter vivos gifts from parents and grandparents (or other relatives). As can be seen in col-
umn 1 of Panel B, the wealth of the fourth generation children is very highly correlated with 
those of their parents and grandparents, very much in line with this reasoning. 
 
So how do the estimates in Panel C of Table 4 compare with estimates for the three-
generation sample underlying the estimates in Table 2, if we use wealth observed at a younger 
age for those children? As can be seen in an Online Appendix Table 7, estimates are quite 
similar to the ones reported in panel C of Table 4 for the four generation sample. Hence, we 
conclude that the difference in the results for the three and four generation sample is driven by 
the differences in age of the child generation. It is probably the case that the younger the chil-
dren, the larger is the role of grandparents, perhaps because they are able to take a more active 
part in their grandchildren’s life when they themselves are younger.  
 
Also, as argued in Boserup et al. (2016), the parent-child wealth relationship is U-shaped 
across the life cycle, with largest persistence when the child generation is young (driven by 
inter vivos gifts and transfers) and old (when they have accumulated capital). They find em-
pirical support for this in Denmark, as we do for Sweden.  
3. The role of inheritance for intergenerational wealth transmission 
Having established a positive association between mid-life wealth of parents and children, and 
a limited role for grandparents, we now turn to an investigation of mechanisms. In this section 
we look at the role of inheritance, and in the next section on the role of human capital and 
labour market productivity, in explaining the transmission of inequality in wealth between 
parents and children. 
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Material inheritance represents a central possible determinant of the intergenerational wealth 
associations reported in previous sections. As we observe both midlife wealth of the first two 
generations, terminal wealth of the first generation as well as the exact bequeathed amounts as 
reported in inheritance tax records, we can actually calculate the present value of inheritances 
as well as identify their impact on wealth mobility with high precision. To our knowledge this 
constitutes a unique contribution to the intergenerational mobility literature. 
 
We perform several tests of how important bequests are in the wealth mobility process. To 
make these tests cleaner, we now measure wealth in the child generation in 1991 (the latest 
possible year), and restrict the sample to those having received inheritances before that year 
(so that at least one parent has died before 1991). We also perform tests on a smaller sample 
where both parents have died.  
 
First, we rerun our baseline regressions but add inheritances, ranked within year of death 
groups.41 Such a “mediating-variable” approach is coarse but potentially captures the role of 
bequests for the transmission of wealth between parents and children (see Appendix D). The 
results in Table 5 are shown for the full sample, where bequests come from one or both par-
ents, and for the subsample where we observe inheritances from both parents.  
 
The results suggest that bequests are an important source of an individual’s wealth status. Re-
gressing child wealth rank on inheritance rank (columns 1 and 4) show high and statistically 
significant correlations between 0.32 and 0.38. Turning to the baseline generational equation 
(columns 2 and 5), parental wealth correlations are around the same levels as seen before, 
between 0.26 and 0.31. When adding ranked inheritance to the baseline model (columns 3 and 
6), parental wealth correlations drop to 0.12 and 0.14, which represents a drop of between 50 
and 60 per cent. This is a remarkably large reduction, suggesting that inherited wealth ac-
counts for the majority of the measured intergenerational wealth correlation. We have also 
                                                 
41 We rank within year of death groups rather than birth cohort groups because we want to capture the relative 
size of the received inheritance at a certain time. Ranking within birth cohorts could be very misleading if par-
ents die at very different times. Ideally we would have ranked within interacted birth cohort-year of death 
groups, but our data set is much too small for this to be feasible.  
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experimented with controlling for second and third degree fractional polynomials42 in inher-
itances, leading to a somewhat smaller child-parent wealth estimate (see Online Appendix 
Table 8).  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
One potential problem with comparing the wealth and inheritance estimates in columns 3 and 
6 of Table 5 is that a higher degree of measurement error in wealth, relative to inheritance, 
would lead to worse attenuation bias for wealth, and hence that we would overestimate the 
importance of inheritance for the intergenerational transmission of wealth. To check this, we 
rerun the regressions imposing bottom-censoring of inheritance at the same place in the distri-
bution as for first generation wealth. Results are very similar (see Online Appendix Table 9, 
Panel A), and the drop in elasticity is again such that over 50 per cent are due to inheritances. 
We also do this analysis for top decile regressions (see Online Appendix Table 9, Panel B), 
where both wealth and inheritances equal one for the top decile of observations. We find once 
again a large impact of controlling for inheritances, with a decrease in the child-parent top 
decile wealth estimate of more than 50 percent.  
 
A second test of the role of inheritance for wealth mobility is to purge children’s wealth of the 
value of inheritance. Suppose that we would have information on inheritances just before 
measuring wealth in the child generation. This would have allowed us to simply subtract in-
heritances from wealth in the child generation, and then given us the intergenerational rank 
correlation in wealth, net of inheritances, without having to estimate the coefficient for the 
mediating variable inheritances.43 With our data on the timing of inheritances in relation to 
when we measure wealth for the second generation, we can do this analysis indirectly.  
 
                                                 
42 See Royston and Altman (1994) for a discussion of the method. An advantage with this is that since we in-
clude inheritances in levels and control for them semi-parametrically, we sidestep the issue of choosing how to 
rank inheritances, and are able to directly control for both birth cohort and year of death in a flexible manner. 
43 Since inheritance is a mediating variable in the estimations where we control for parents’ wealth rank, it can 
result in downward biased estimates for parents’ wealth (unless the size of inheritances is exogenously deter-
mined). This is because the size of the inheritance is likely to be correlated with other mediating variables. If this 
is the case, adding inheritance as a control variable will also remove some of the correlation running through 
these other channels.  
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Specifically, we construct an “inheritance-free” measure of wealth of the child generation 
which is regressed on the wealth of parents. To do this, specify the following regression mod-
el:  
 
(2)  ݓ௜௬ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܿଵܫ௜௬ି௧ ൅ ߜ൫ݐ ∙ ܫ௜௬ି௧൯ ൅ ߣ൫ݐ ∙ ܫ௜௬ି௧ଶ ൯ ൅ ߛݓ௜௣ ൅ ݑ௜௬, 
 
where ݓ௜௬ is wealth of the child measured at the end of year ݕ (here 1991), ݓ௜௣ is (mid-life) 
wealth of the parent and ܫ௜௬ି௧ is the sum of the child’s inheritance received on average at year 
ݕ െ ݐ, which is also interacted with a second-order polynomial in average time since receiving 
the inheritances. The second order polynomial is included in order to allow for a fairly unre-
stricted growth path of the value of inheritances from ݕ െ ݐ to ݕ. We include parent’s wealth 
as a control variable since growth rates of inheritances might vary for children with different 
parental mid-life wealth. Note that both wealth and inheritances in equation (2) are measured 
in levels.  
 
We construct the “inheritance-free” measure of wealth as follows. After having estimated 
equation (2) (the first stage), we set the coefficient estimates on the inheritance terms equal to 
zero and construct the “inheritance-free” measure of wealth as ݓ௜௬ᇱ ൌ ොܽ଴ ൅ ߛොݓ௜௣ ൅ ݑො௜௬, where 
ݕ ൌ 1991, for the individuals in the child generation.44 Hence, the coefficient estimates and 
the residuals are estimated from a regression with controls for inheritances. There are few 
restrictions on the value growth of past inheritances; we simply remove the average size of 
past inheritances (in constant prices) across time for all heirs.45 This “purged” wealth is then 
ranked within age groups and regressed on parental wealth rank, as in equation 1 (the second 
stage). 
 
                                                 
44 Of course, it would be equivalent to calculate ݓ௜௬ᇱ  as the difference between ݓ௜௬ and the inheritance terms in 
equation (2). 
45 We have tried alternative approaches, either to do as Modigliani (1988) suggested and assume that past inher-
itances only grow along with the general price level (which generates lower inheritance values than the ones we 
use in our preferred estimation of equation 3) or to follow Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and assume that inher-
itances grow at the same rate as the whole economy (which generates larger inheritance values). In the Online 
Appendix Table 10 we try these two variants, and parent-child wealth rank correlations lie between 0.03 and 
0.04 in the inflation-adjustment case and between –0.06 and–0.09 when adjusting for GDP growth. These esti-
mates are always statistically insignificant. In other words, these other ways to calculate the present value of past 
inheritances produce qualitatively similar results as our main inheritance analysis. 
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Results from these inheritance-purged wealth regressions are presented in Table 6, with Pan-
els A and B reporting first- and second-stage results. Columns 1–3 show the analysis on the 
full sample, columns 4–6 only consider cases where we observe both parents’ bequests to 
their offspring and columns 7–8 again uses the full sample but constrain inheritances to be 
fully passed on to children (i.e., setting ܿଵ ൌ 1 in equation 3).46 Overall, the findings confirm 
the results above that suggested a large importance of inheritance in wealth mobility and the 
results are strikingly consistent across specifications. First-stage inheritance effects are large 
and significant, with main effects being in the range of 2.4–3.0 which is notably larger than 1. 
The direct effect falls over time, however, indicating that past bequests matter less for current 
wealth the farther back in time they were received. Looking at the main results in the second 
stage, parental wealth effects fall from the baseline of 0.26–0.31 down to 0.03–0.08 when 
removing inheritances. This represents a reduction by between 70 and 90 per cent, which is 
even larger than the reduction in wealth rank correlations found above. In Online Appendix 
Figure 2, we show kernel regressions of this purged wealth measure on parents’ wealth and 
how it relates to a kernel regression of child’s on parent’s wealth.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Taken at face value, these results imply that the major part of the intergenerational correlation 
in wealth runs through the inheritance channel. But if individuals anticipate the size of their 
future inheritance, they might adjust their savings behaviour so that a person expecting a large 
inheritance saves less than an individual expecting a small or no inheritance. This would bias 
our estimates of the correlation net of inheritance downwards, leading us to overestimate the 
relative importance of the inheritance channel. As discussed in Appendix D, an overestimate 
of the importance of the inheritance channel would also follow in the mediating-variable ap-
proach in the presence of any unobserved mediating variable that is (positively) correlated 
with children’s wealth and with inheritances. However, even if our estimates are lower 
bounds on the intergenerational wealth correlation absent inheritances, it is noteworthy that 
they are qualitatively fairly similar despite using two different methods. We therefore con-
clude that inheritance is an important mediating channel for the intergenerational correlation 
in wealth. Interestingly, this significant role of inherited wealth seems to be in line with the 
                                                 
46 If we were able to observe child wealth right after the inheritance was given, we would expect ܿଵ ൌ 1 since the 
time trend terms would be zero and we could then simply subtract the inheritance from child wealth.  
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findings of Ohlsson et al. (2014) concerning the importance of inherited wealth in the econo-
my as a whole: in the post-war era they find that about half of total private wealth in the econ-
omy is inherited, a result that is similar to that found for France by Piketty (2011). 
4. The role of other factors: human capital and labour productivity  
In addition to material transfers, the intergenerational transmission of wealth may also work 
through human capital and labour market productivity channels, as suggested by the theoreti-
cal models of, e.g., Becker (1974) and Becker and Tomes (1979). Our dataset includes 
measures of educational attainment and lifetime earnings for the first three generations, allow-
ing us to address this issue. Specifically, we follow Charles and Hurst (2003) and Boserup et 
al. (2014) and include these measures for all generations used in the regressions.  
 
Table 7 show regression results for the second generation, corresponding directly to our inher-
itance analysis in the previous section. Columns 1–3 report baseline estimates, first from an 
intergenerational wealth regression and then from intergenerational earnings and schooling 
regressions. The estimates are similar to the correlations presented by Lindahl et al. (2015).47 
 
Human capital variables are then included as additional controls in the wealth estimations; 
earnings in column 4, schooling in column 5 and both earnings and schooling in column 6. 
These controls reduce the intergenerational wealth estimate from 0.29 to 0.21–0.23, i.e., by 
around one-fourth. This result differs from Boserup et al. (2014), which found that their 
wealth correlations where not affected by including similar controls. Comparing this with the 
inheritance analysis above suggests a fairly consistent picture, with the relative importance of 
inheritance for intergenerational wealth transmission being at least 50 per cent and human 
capital-related factors representing 25 per cent. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
We have also regressed the (inheritance-) purged wealth measure used in the previous section 
on the schooling and earnings measures of parents and children (see Online Appendix Table 
11). We then find zero rank-rank wealth correlations, which is what we would expect if inher-
                                                 
47 They are not identical, as samples and variable definitions differ somewhat. Note that the earnings associations 
here are lower than in Lindahl et al. (2015) because we now use family earnings (instead of father’s earnings). 
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itance plays a very important role for the intergenerational wealth rank correlations (which is 
what we find in Tables 5 and 6). Note that this is also consistent with that controlling for in-
heritances removes those mediating channels that work through education and earnings.  
 
In Online Appendix Table 12 we also report third-generation mediating variables regressions, 
on parental and grandparental variables. Only including parental variables, the child-parent 
wealth rank estimate decreases by 25 per cent, which exactly confirms the results reported in 
Table 7. Mechanisms related to human capital and labor productivity can therefore not ex-
plain the increase in the parent-child wealth estimate over time as observed in Table 2. Also 
including grandparental variables, the child-parent wealth rank estimate is unchanged, where-
as the conditional child-grandparent wealth rank correlation decreases from a positive (but 
statistically insignificant) estimate to an estimate very close to zero.  
5. Conclusions 
We have estimated multigenerational wealth models using a unique data set, partly compiled 
specifically for this study, that enables us to improve on previous studies. First, we estimate 
models for two and three generations measuring wealth in mid-life for all three generations. 
Second, using matched data on bequests we are the first to directly measure the importance of 
this specific channel for the intergenerational transmission of wealth. Third, we present evi-
dence on four-generational wealth transmissions, observing wealth of great grandchildren at a 
time when they have not yet entered the labour market. In addition to these contributions, we 
use high quality data on education attainment and lifetime earnings for three generations to 
compare our multigenerational wealth estimates to estimates for other outcomes as well as to 
decompose multigenerational wealth transmission into parts due to education and earnings, 
and other factors.  
 
Our main findings are twofold. First, we find that grandparents’ wealth is strongly associated 
with grandchildren’s wealth, but that most of the association is mediated by parents’ wealth. 
Grandparents’ wealth seems to matter for an individual’s wealth status also conditional on 
parents’ wealth, but the estimated effect is relatively small. We predict that long-run wealth 
mobility is lower than what is predicted by a standard AR(1) model, but by a magnitude that 
suggest higher mobility than for most previous studies using data on education (Lindahl et al., 
2015) and occupation (Long and Ferrie, 2013). We believe that we can rule out that measure-
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ment error in wealth for the first generation drives this result. Instead we argue that these dif-
ferences are partly due to different mechanisms between wealth and the other outcomes.  
 
Second, we observe a strikingly large role for inheritances in explaining intergenerational 
wealth transmission. The estimates indicate that at least half of wealth persistence is account-
ed for by direct transfers from parents (and grandparents). If correct, these results profoundly 
change our understanding of what drives mobility in the wealth distribution. Furthermore, 
recent survey evidence indicates that the perceived fairness of a certain level of inequality and 
the extent to which interventions are called for to change it largely depend on how this situa-
tion has come about; in particular, the extent to which economic success is inherited or self-
made seems crucial (see, e.g., Mulligan, 1997; Arrow, Bowles and Durlauf, 1999; and Bowles 
and Gintis, 2002). Against this backdrop, a possible interpretation of our results is that policy 
measures aimed at levelling the distribution of inherited wealth, e.g., gift and inheritance taxa-
tion, are desirable from an equality of opportunity perspective. 
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Table 1a: Summary statistics: Wealth distribution 
 Mean (s.d.) p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Obs. 
 Panel A: 2nd gen sample 
1st gen 182.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.1 247.4 1147 
 (1085.7)       
1st gen,  56.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5 98.7 1147 
capitalized (253.3)       
1st gen,  194.8 0.1 24.0 72.5 193.3 445.4 1093 
estate (454.6)       
2nd gen 254.9 -1.1 19.1 121.1 346.7 667.9 1147 
 (410.1)       
Inheritance 116.2 9.9 22.4 49.8 117.2 274.4 809 
 (203.3)       
 Panel B: 3rd gen sample 
1st gen 185.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.1 256.9 2100 
 (1234.8)       
1st gen,  64.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.7 101.9 2100 
capitalized (293.9)       
1st gen,  203.2 0.0 19.6 67.4 181.3 451.3 2012 
estate (496.7)       
2nd gen 445.9 -6.8 37.6 208.1 599.6 1160.4 2100 
 (814.7)       
3rd gen 705.4 -162.8 -11.5 305.6 865.4 1749.7 2100 
 (2045.8)       
 Panel C: 4th gen sample 
1st gen 199.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 57.1 247.4 3755 
 (1344.0)       
1st gen,  69.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 112.6 3755 
capitalized (311.9)       
1st gen,  204.5 0.0 17.1 66.2 181.3 467.7 3611 
estate (498.2)       
2nd gen 447.0 -5.3 38.1 205.7 610.9 1177.6 3755 
 (816.6)       
3rd gen 1608.7 -219.5 86.8 751.0 1826.1 3481.4 3755 
 (5031.2)       
4th gen 102.6 -110.9 0.0 21.4 113.2 397.1 3755 
 (463.6)       
Notes: Table shows means with standard deviations and selected percentiles for the wealth variables. In Panel A 
variables are individual-level for the 2nd generation and family-level for the 1st generation; in Panel B variables 
are individual-level for the 3rd generation and family-level for previous generations; and in Panel C variables are 
individual-level for the 4th generation and family-level for previous generations. 
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Table 1b: Summary statistics: covariates 
 2nd gen sample  3rd gen sample  4th gen sample 
 Mean  
(s.d.) 
Obs.  Mean  
(s.d.) 
Obs.  Mean  
(s.d.) 
Obs. 
Earnings         
 1st -0.035 1139  -0.035 2083  -0.029 3723 
 (0.499)   (0.499)   (0.509)  
 2nd -0.083 1142  -0.052 2100  -0.057 3755 
 (0.663)   (0.590)   (0.593)  
 3rd    -0.087 2044  -0.036 3741 
    (0.720)   (0.679)  
Schooling         
 1st 7.3 1118  7.4 2052  7.4 3682 
 (1.7)   (1.7)   (1.7)  
 2nd 10.0 1143  10.1 2094  10.1 3747 
 (2.9)   (2.5)   (2.6)  
 3rd    12.4 2091  12.4 3753 
    (2.6)   (2.3)  
 4th       12.7 1553 
       (2.0)  
Year of birth         
 1st 1897.8 1147  1897.9 2100  1898.0 3755 
 (6.4)   (6.5)   (6.5)  
 2nd 1927.9 1147  1921.8 2100  1920.7 3755 
 (0.4)   (8.7)   (6.0)  
 3rd    1956.6 2100  1956.2 3755 
    (5.7)   (5.8)  
 4th       1985.6 3755 
       (8.4)  
Year of death         
 1st 1973.0 1146  1972.9 2098  1972.9 3752 
 (11.7)   (12.1)   (12.1)  
Notes: Table shows means with standard deviations for residualised log earnings, years of schooling, and years 
of birth and death. In the first set of columns variables are individual-level for the 2nd generation and family-
level for the 1st generation; in the second set of columns variables are individual-level for the 3rd generation and 
family-level for previous generations; and in the third set of columns variables are individual-level for the 4th 
generation and family-level for previous generations. 
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Table 2: Wealth regressions 
 2nd generation  3rd generation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Rank regressions 
Parents 0.296***  0.391***  0.382*** 
 (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
Grandparents    0.166*** 0.041 
    (0.032) (0.030) 
R2 0.077  0.174 0.044 0.181 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
 Panel B: Top decile regressions 
Parents 0.178***  0.340***  0.323*** 
 (0.041)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
Grandparents    0.153*** 0.061* 
    (0.036) (0.034) 
R2 0.052  0.135 0.044 0.145 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth in column 1, and 3rd generation tax-register wealth in columns 2-4. Explanatory variables are tax-register 
wealth for parents and grandparents. In panel A, all wealth variables have been percentile ranked within birth 
cohort groups. In panel B, all wealth variables are dummy variables equal to one for individuals in the top 10 per 
cent of the wealth distribution within their birth cohort group, and zero otherwise. All regressions include birth 
cohort group dummies for all generations. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Wealth regressions, alternative measures for 1st generation 
 2nd generation  3rd generation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Capitalized wealth for 1st generation 
Parents 0.333***   0.391***   0.386*** 
  (0.034)   (0.024)   (0.027) 
Grandparents      0.159***  0.024 
      (0.035)  (0.033) 
R2  0.087   0.174 0.040  0.181 
N  1147   2100 2100  2100 
  Panel B: Estate wealth for 1st generation 
Parents  0.334***   0.389***   0.388*** 
  (0.030)   (0.025)   (0.027) 
Grandparents      0.144***  0.003 
      (0.028)  (0.026) 
R2  0.133   0.266 0.052  0.185 
N  1093   2012 2012  2012 
  Panel C: Imputed wealth for 1st generation 
Parents  0.267***   0.392***   0.381*** 
  (0.029)   (0.244)   (0.027) 
Grandparents      0.162***  0.044 
      (0.028)  (0.027) 
N  1120   2053 2053  2053 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth in column 1, and 3rd generation tax-register wealth in columns 2-3. Explanatory variables are tax-register 
wealth for parents and grandparents in panel A. 1st generation wealth (parents in column 1, grandparents in 
columns 2-3) is calculated from capital income information in panel A; it is wealth at death from estate records 
in panel B; and in panel C the censored observations of the wealth variable have been imputed (see text for de-
tails). Note that the estimates in column 2 are not affected by the alternative wealth measures, but that they devi-
ate from the baseline estimate because of small variations in the samples. All wealth variables are percentile 
ranked within birth cohort groups, and all regressions include birth cohort group dummies for both generations. * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4: 4th generation wealth regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Panel A: Full sample 
Parents 0.387***   0.350*** 0.352*** 
 (0.022)   (0.023) (0.023) 
Grandparents  0.222***  0.103*** 0.111*** 
  (0.026)  (0.024) (0.025) 
Great grandparents   0.104***  -0.005 
   (0.030)  (0.026) 
R2 0.160 0.061 0.027 0.175 0.190 
N 3755 3755 3755 3755 3755 
 Panel B: Age 18 and younger 
Parents 0.519***   0.472*** 0.478*** 
 (0.032)   (0.033) (0.032) 
Grandparents  0.300***  0.141*** 0.143*** 
  (0.039)  (0.033) (0.035) 
Great grandparents   0.131***  -0.030 
   (0.042)  (0.035) 
R2 0.297 0.118 0.054 0.331 0.360 
N 1657 1657 1657 1657 1657 
 Panel C: Older than 18 
Parents 0.269***   0.243*** 0.250*** 
 (0.027)   (0.028) (0.028) 
Grandparents  0.154***  0.073** 0.078*** 
  (0.029)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Great grandparents   0.066*  -0.001 
   (0.034)  (0.031) 
R2 0.084 0.035 0.021 0.095 0.112 
N 2098 2098 2098 2098 2098 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 4th generation tax-register 
wealth. Explanatory variables are tax-register wealth for parents, grandparents, and great grandparents. All 
wealth variables are percentile ranked within birth cohort groups, and all regressions include birth cohort group 
dummies for all included generations. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Inheritance regressions 
 One or two parents bequeathing  Two parents bequeathing 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Parents’ wealth   0.262*** 0.116***   0.310*** 0.144** 
  (0.039) (0.044)   (0.054) (0.068) 
Inheritance 0.318***  0.258***  0.379***  0.277*** 
 (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.057)  (0.073) 
R2 0.120 0.071 0.140  0.144 0.113 0.181 
N 809 809 809  386 386 386 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth in 1991. Explanatory variables are tax-register wealth for parents and total inheritance received from 
parents. Parent’s wealth has been percentile ranked within birth cohort groups, and average inheritance has been 
percentile ranked within parental year of death groups. All regressions include birth and death cohort group 
dummies corresponding to the included variables. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Purged inheritance regressions 
 Main  Only both inheritances  Constrained 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Panel A: First stage 
Inheritance  2.351*** 2.406***   2.989*** 2.793***  1 1 
  (0.584) (0.551)   (0.699) (0.675)    
Inheritance x t  -0.109** -0.114**   -0.155** -0.134**  0.009 0.009 
  (0.052) (0.050)   (0.066) (0.064)  (0.022) (0.022) 
Inheritance x t2  0.002 0.002*   0.002* 0.002  -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Parents' wealth   -0.012    0.042   0.005 
   (0.022)    (0.034)   (0.024) 
R2 0.000 0.164 0.164   0.000 0.236    
 Panel B: Second stage 
Parents’ wealth 0.262*** 0.030 0.026  0.310*** 0.031 0.075  0.060 0.058 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.043)  (0.054) (0.059) (0.059)  (0.042) (0.043) 
R2 0.071 0.010 0.010  0.113 0.040 0.046  0.011 0.010 
N 809 809 809  386 386 386  809 809 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Panel A shows regressions of 2nd generation wealth measured in 1991 on received inheritance and parental 
wealth. t is the time in years between parents’ average year of death and time when child wealth is measured. All variables in panel A are in levels. In panel B, the outcome 
variable is child wealth excluding inheritance, calculated as the predicted value from the first stage with the inheritance coefficients set to zero, and the residual added back in. 
In columns 4-6, only those who have received inheritances from both parents are included. In columns 7-8, the coefficient on inheritance in the first stage regression has been 
constrained to equal 1. Columns 1 and 4 show regressions using unadjusted child’s wealth. In panel B, all regressions include birth cohort group dummies for both genera-
tions. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: 2nd generation mediating variables regressions 
 Wealth Earnings Schooling Wealth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parents' wealth 0.288***   0.226*** 0.228*** 0.209*** 
 (0.034)   (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
Parents' earnings  0.190***  0.083**  0.050 
  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
Parents' schooling   0.309***  0.048 0.029 
   (0.031)  (0.034) (0.034) 
Own earnings    0.222***  0.186*** 
    (0.030)  (0.031) 
Own schooling     0.188*** 0.117*** 
     (0.032) (0.033) 
R2 0.072 0.048 0.104 0.142 0.122 0.154 
N 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 1103 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth in columns 1 and 3-6, earnings in column 2, and schooling in column 3. Explanatory variables are par-
ents’ tax-register wealth, earnings, and schooling, and own earnings and schooling. All wealth variables are 
percentile ranked within birth cohort groups. Earnings is percentile ranked lifetime earnings, and schooling is 
percentile ranked years of completed schooling. All regressions include birth cohort group dummies for all in-
cluded generations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1: Kernel regressions 
Notes: Solid lines show results from bivariate local linear kernel regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel and 
0.12 bandwidth. The x axis shows ancestors’ wealth percentile rank, and the y axis shows descendants’ wealth 
percentile rank. The variables have been residualised by regressing out birth cohort dummies for both genera-
tions, and the residuals have been rescaled to have the same range as the original percentile ranked variables. 
Dashed lines show best linear fits, and the vertical lines along the bottom show the distribution of observations 
across. Note that the lines stop at around the 25th percentile in figures 1a, 1c and 1f because of the large number 
of observations with zero wealth in the first generation).  
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Appendix A Wealth measures 
A1. Wealth measured during life 
A1.1 First generation 
We measure wealth of the first generation (most born in the 1890s) at two points in time: 
1945 and 1952. The observations were collected manually from the individual income and 
wealth tax records that are stored in the local county archives in Malmö (Malmö Stadsarkiv). 
Locating individuals in the income and wealth tax registers in this period is not uncomplicat-
ed, but requires parallel searches in address calendars (to get names of block and street ad-
dress) and often different books containing the actual tax records.  
 
For the 1945 observations, we use tax records (taxeringslängder) from 1946 showing incomes 
and wealth in 1945. During the period 1911–1946, this information is available in the income 
and tax register since personal wealth was taxed jointly with income. Specifically, one hun-
dredth of taxable net wealth was added to taxable income; if net wealth was negative, nothing 
was added. For reasons of discretion, an individual’s net wealth was not reported directly in 
the tax records, but for 1945 it is possible to back out taxable wealth from the reported income 
and deduction items (before income year 1945 tax register items were structured differently 
and do unfortunately not allow for this to be done). In the register, the reported item “taxable 
amount” ܶ (taxerat belopp) is the tax base. It equals the reported total gross income ܻ (sam-
manräknad nettoinkomst) less the reported “general deductions” ܦ (medgivna allmänna av-
drag) plus the non-reported wealth share ෩ܹ  (förmögenhetsandel), equal to 1/100 of taxable 
net wealth ܹ. Writing the taxable amount as ܶ ൌ ܻ െ ܦ ൅ ෩ܹ  and using the fact that we ob-
serve the first three terms in this equation in the tax register, we can retrieve the personal tax-
able net wealth ܹ ൌ 100 ∙ ሺܶ ൅ ܦ െ ܻሻ. Note that exactly this procedure is the one used by 
Statistics Sweden when analyzing the wealth distribution for the Census of 1945 (Statistics 
Sweden, 1949, p. 2*).  
 
Taxable wealth in 1952 is also collected manually from the tax registers. After a wealth tax 
reform in 1947, however, in this year wealth was taxed separately from income and we re-
trieve explicitly stated net wealth amounts from wealth tax registers (förmögenhetstaxerings-
längder). In 1952, all households owning net assets worth at least 30,000 SEK had to hand in 
a wealth tax return. Approximately nine percent (329,000 out of 3.7 million) of Swedish 
households reported owning wealth above the taxable threshold, and in our population they 
were eight percent. 
 
A detail to note is that this first-generation wealth cannot take negative values because of how 
the tax statistics are reported. In 1945, only non-negative wealth is allowed to contribute to 
the total taxable amount on the tax return, and in 1952 we only observe households with 
wealth above a tax threshold. 
A1.2 Second generation 
Wealth held by the second generation (mostly born in 1928) is in the form of taxable wealth 
observed in tax registers during the years 1985, 1988 and 1991 (thus measured at ages 57–63). 
Included in the wealth measure for 1985 and 1988 is the tax value of real estate, which is 75 
percent of market value. Because we also have separate information on real estate tax value, 
we can scale this up to market value and add the difference to the wealth measure. This re-
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duces the number of zero (censored) observations by around 10 percentage points. This aug-
mented measure is used in a sensitivity analysis. 
 
In the first two years for which we measure wealth is censored from below at zero whereas 
this is not the case for the last year, the reason being different reporting routines at the tax 
authority after the Swedish tax reform of 1990–1991. 
A1.3 Third and fourth generations 
Third (born in the 1950s) generation’s wealth is measured in 1999 and 2006 (thus measured at 
ages 43–50), and fourth generation’s wealth (born in the 1980s) is measured in 2006 (around 
age 20). While these wealth data also stem from the wealth tax, they differ from the wealth 
tax return register data used for the first two generations by being partly based on third-party 
reported financial asset statements of banks and brokerage firms. The data comes from Statis-
tics Sweden’s Wealth Register which covers wealth statements for all individuals, i.e., not 
only households filing tax returns, in Sweden between 1999 and 2007. 
 
All assets and liabilities in the Wealth Register are in current market prices, which is a differ-
ence which means that tax-assessed property values are multiplied by a sales price ratio 
(computed by Statistics Sweden using data on actual sales prices and tax assessments for 
homes sold) and reported in market values. Wealth observations cease in 2007 due to the re-
peal of the Swedish wealth tax in that year. 
A2. Wealth measured at death: Estate inventory reports 
For all deceased individuals in the first and second generations, we have collected estate 
wealth data. These records come from estate inventory reports (bouppteckningar) that the law 
mandates to be set up for each deceased individual with some assets.48 The reports contain 
information about civil status (years of marriage, remarriages), estate wealth composition 
(value of housing, life insurance savings), inter vivos gifts, wills, pre-nuptial agreements and 
inheritance waivers, generally for both father and mother. Up until 2001 the estate reports 
were filed with local courts and archived in one of Sweden’s nine local county archives, and 
since 2001 they are filed at the tax authorities.  
 
In order to locate a deceased individual’s estate inventory report one needs to know the date 
and place of death, and we have retrieved this information from the original database and 
from the official death register in Sweden. 
A3. Inheritances 
Inheritances are observed when parents bequeathed wealth to their children in the second gen-
eration. We do not include inheritances from others than the parents, i.e., siblings, other rela-
tives or non-relatives. Elinder, Erixson and Waldenström (2016) show that almost two thirds 
of inheritances in Sweden in the early 2000s come from parents. 
 
An inheritance lot is calculated for each heir by the tax authorities and then reported in specif-
ic inheritance tax records (arvsskattestegar) which are filed with the local county archives 
                                                 
48 For individuals without notable wealth, typically very young people, an estate notification (dödsboanmälan) is 
typically filed. 
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until 2001 after which it is kept by the tax authorities. Typically, the tax record is also at-
tached to each estate inventory report.  
 
It should be noted that these inheritance lots were based on a close scrutiny of the probated 
wealth, accounting for wills if they existed and taxable inter vivos gifts made within ten years 
of the testator’s death. 
Appendix B Earnings and Education 
Lifetime earnings are calculated by taking residuals from a regression of log earnings (for 
left-hand side variables) or log within-family average earnings (for right-hand side variables) 
on a quadratic in birth year and a full set of income year dummies. For the first generation, we 
observe earnings in 1929, 1933, 1937, 1938, and 1942; for the second and third generations, 
we observe earnings in 35 different years between 1948 and 2008, restricted to observations at 
age 23 and older for the second generation, and 27 and older for the third generation.  
 
Our log earnings measure is constructed as from regressing log earnings on a cubic in birth 
year and year indicators (done separately by generation and gender), taking the residuals 
which then are averaged over years. Labor income is compiled from Swedish high quality 
registers for all years that we use. For the first generation we have access to income data as 5 
yearly measures spanning 13 years, typically observed between ages 33 and 46. For the sec-
ond and third generations we can more or less observe lifetime earnings for most of the indi-
viduals. See Lindahl et al. (2015) for details. 
 
There is no direct information on educational attainments for the first generation. However, 
since the 1938 survey contains detailed information on occupational status, the educational 
requirements for each occupation were constructed by the educational scientists who original-
ly obtained the data. There are no education classifications available for the mothers of the 
index generation.  
 
For the second to fourth generations, we have obtained data on educational attainments from 
the national education register. We mainly use information from 1985 for the second genera-
tion and from 2009 for the third and fourth generations. Years of schooling is constructed 
from educational levels available in registers for the second, third and fourth generations. 
With detailed information on completed level of education, we construct years of schooling as 
follows: seven for (old) primary school, nine for (new) compulsory schooling, 9.5 for (old) 
postprimary school (realskola), 11 for short high school, 12 for long high school, 14 for short 
university, 15.5 for long university, and 19 for a PhD. For more details, see Lindahl (2015).  
Appendix C Estimating the long-run intergenerational persistence in social status 
Clark (2012) and Clark and Cummins (2014) propose that intergenerational transmission of 
wealth is evolving as ݓ௜௧ ൌ ݔ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧  and ݔ௜௧ ൌ ܾݔ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ݁௜௧ . This should be interpreted as 
wealth mismeasuring ݔ , the underlying “social status”, and that the true value of wealth 
evolves as an AR(1) between generations. Clark and Cummins (2014) label the parameter ܾ 
as the long-run intergenerational persistence in social status and show that that if we estimate 
bivariate models between n generations we get ܧൣߚመ௡൧ ൌ ߠܾ௡ where ߠ is the reliability ratio of 
ݓ in measuring ݔ, and ߚመ௡ is from the regression ݓ௜௧ା௡ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௡ݓ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ା௡. Hence, we get 
that ܧൣߚመଶ൧ ൌ ܧൣߚመଵ൧ܾ, which is a formula that can be used to derive b in the following way: 
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divide the estimate from a regression of child’s wealth on grandparents’ wealth by an estimate 
from a regression of parent’s wealth on grandparents’ wealth.49  
 
As pointed out in Solon (2015), this is just an instrumental variable estimate, where grandpar-
ents’ wealth is used as an instrument parent’s wealth in a regression of child’s wealth on par-
ent’s wealth. If the simple model by Clark and Cummins (2014) fails to hold true (Solon, 
2015, lists a number of reasons for why this might be the case), this IV estimate is most likely 
(as argued in Lindahl, 2015) an upper bound estimate of b. To make use of the fact that we 
have family-linked data on three adjacent generations, we, in section 2.2.2 where we compare 
our results in Lindahl et al. (2015) with the results in the present paper, instead divide by the 
average of two estimates: the estimate from a regression of child and parents wealth and the 
estimate from a regression of parent’s and grandparents’ wealth. As pointed out in Braun and 
Stuhler (2015) this requires the additional assumption that measurement error in wealth is 
constant over the first two generations.  
Appendix D Estimating associations in the presence of mediating variables 
When we analyze the impact of inheritance, or bequests (ܤ), on the intergenerational associa-
tion in wealth we must acknowledge that ܤ is a mediating variable. A common approach is to 
proceed by estimating models of the following form:50 
  
(D.1)  ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߩଵݓ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
 
(D.2)  ݓ௜௧ ൌ ߙ′଴ ൅ ߩଶݓ௜௧ିଵ ൅ φܤ௜௧ ൅ ݒ௜௧, 
 
(D.3)  ܤ௜௧ ൌ ߙ′′଴ ൅ ߩଷݓ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜௧, 
 
Under the strong assumption that ܥ݋ݒሺݒ௜௧, ߤ௜௧ሻ ൌ 0, which for example holds if ܤ௜௧ is exoge-
nously determined conditional on ݓ௜௧ିଵ, we can interpret ߩଵ െ ߩଶ as the role of inheritance 
(i.e., the mediating effect of inheritance) in the overall association of wealth across genera-
tions. This can be seen by inserting equation D.3 into D.2, which gives ߩଵ ൌ ߩଶ ൅ φߩଷ . 
Hence, the intergenerational association in wealth between children and parents can be de-
composed into one part that is due to the direct link with parent’s wealth and another part 
which is due to an indirect effect working through the mediating variable ܤ௜௧.  
 
Suppose that ܤ is not exogenously determined - for instance, if ܥ݋ݒሺݒ௜௧, ߤ௜௧ሻ ൐ 0, perhaps 
because there is another mediating variable ܼ௜௧ which is positively correlated with the child’s 
wealth and also with ܤ௜௧ (conditional on parental wealth). Intuitively, by controlling for ܤ௜௧ in 
equation D.2, we “over-control” for ܤ௜௧ in the sense that we control not only for ܤ௜௧, but also 
the part of ܼ௜௧ that is correlated with ܤ௜௧. Hence, φ will be overestimated and ߩଶ, the direct 
channel linking parents’ and child wealth, will be underestimated. It follows that ߩଵ െ ߩଶ and 
the importance of ܤ௜௧ as a mediating channel will be overestimated. An example of underes-
timating the importance of the inheritance channel would be if inheritances are poorly meas-
ured, in relation to parent’s wealth.  
                                                 
49 Braun and Stuhler (2014) show that the Clark-model has a number of testable implications such as this one, 
which they use to test the model on multigenerational data for Germany.  
50 See, for example, Blanden et al. (2007) who analyze a number of channels underlying the intergenerational 
persistence in income in the U.K. 
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In testing the importance of inheritances for the intergenerational persistence in wealth, our 
first approach is simply to use ranked versions of the variables, and estimate ߩଵ and ߩଶ. Our 
second approach utilizes the fact that if ܤ௜௧ is given just before wealth of the child is meas-
ured, we will have that φ=1 and hence ܤ௜௧ can be simply be subtracted from ݓ௜௧ to create an 
“inheritance-free” wealth variable ݓ௜௧′ for the child generation which we then regress against 
can ݓ௜௧ିଵ. In practice, we need to use the timing variation of inheritances and estimate a flex-
ible version of equation D.2, and subtract the impact of inheritances on the wealth in the child 
generation. We then regress this “inheritance-free” measure of children’s wealth on parental 
wealth to generate an alternative estimate of ߩଶ, which we use to estimate ߩଵ െ ߩଶ. An ad-
vantage with the second approach is that, if our model is correct, we do not need to estimate 
φ, but can simply assume that φ=1.  
 
Note that when we investigate the importance of schooling and earnings for the intergenera-
tional association in wealth, similar issues exists. An advantage is that we can then control for 
schooling and earnings in both generations, which is not possible for inheritances. 
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Online Appendix Tables and Figures 
 
Online Appendix Table 1: Wealth regressions, alternative definitions and measures 
 2nd generation  3rd generation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Real estate at market value 
Parents 0.290***  0.400***  0.391*** 
 (0.033)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Grandparents    0.166*** 0.036 
    (0.032) (0.029) 
R2 0.075  0.179 0.044 0.186 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
 Panel B: Wealth left-censored at zero 
Parents 0.304***  0.417***  0.407*** 
 (0.033)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Grandparents    0.179*** 0.042 
    (0.032) (0.030) 
R2 0.081  0.193 0.047 0.201 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
 Panel C: 1st generation wealth imputed using estate wealth 
Parents 0.308***  0.389***  0.381*** 
 (0.029)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
Grandparents    0.168*** 0.030 
    (0.027) (0.027) 
N 1093  2012 2012 2012 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth in column 1, and 3rd generation tax-register wealth in columns 2-4. Explanatory variables are tax-register 
wealth for parents and grandparents. All wealth variables have been percentile ranked within birth cohort groups. 
In panel A, 2nd generation wealth is average of 1985 and 1988 wealth, where real estate has been scaled up to 
market value. In panel B, 2nd and 3rd generation wealth has been left-censored at zero. In panel C, zeroes in 1st 
generation wealth have been imputed using estate wealth. All regressions include birth cohort group dummies 
for all generations. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Online Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics: ranked variables 
 2nd gen sample  3rd gen sample  4th gen sample 
 Mean 
(s.d.) 
Min 
Max 
Obs.  Mean 
(s.d.) 
Min 
Max 
Obs.  Mean 
(s.d.) 
Min 
Max 
Obs. 
Wealth            
 1st 0.508 0.245 1147  0.500 0.217 2100  0.501 0.225 3755 
 (0.253) 0.996   (0.248) 0.996   (0.246) 0.998  
 1st,  0.504 0.289 1147  0.499 0.267 2100  0.500 0.246 3755 
capitalized (0.240) 0.997   (0.233) 0.994   (0.232) 0.997  
 1st,  0.510 0.003 1093  0.499 0.003 2012  0.499 0.002 3611 
estate (0.284) 0.997   (0.284) 0.996   (0.285) 0.997  
 2nd 0.504 0.001 1147  0.504 0.002 2100  0.504 0.001 3755 
 (0.286) 0.999   (0.285) 0.998   (0.287) 0.999  
 3rd     0.499 0.002 2100  0.502 0.001 3755 
     (0.288) 0.998   (0.289) 0.998  
 4th         0.506 0.002 3755 
         (0.289) 0.998  
Earnings            
 1st 0.495 0.005 1139  0.500 0.003 2083  0.499 0.002 3723 
 (0.284) 0.997   (0.286) 0.996   (0.286) 0.995  
 2nd 0.509 0.001 1142  0.509 0.002 2100  0.506 0.001 3755 
 (0.285) 0.999   (0.281) 0.996   (0.282) 0.999  
 3rd     0.507 0.002 2044  0.507 0.001 3741 
     (0.289) 0.998   (0.286) 0.998  
Schooling            
 1st 0.502 0.011 1118  0.502 0.012 2052  0.499 0.019 3682 
 (0.265) 0.993   (0.263) 0.995   (0.262) 0.993  
 2nd 0.497 0.162 1143  0.501 0.038 2094  0.503 0.059 3747 
 (0.285) 0.999   (0.280) 0.996   (0.282) 0.998  
 3rd     0.505 0.002 2091  0.503 0.001 3753 
     (0.283) 0.997   (0.287) 0.998  
 4th         0.500 0.003 1553 
         (0.278) 0.996  
Notes: Table shows means with standard deviations, minimum and maximum values for percentile ranked varia-
bles. In the first set of columns variables are individual-level for the 2nd generation and family-level for the 1st 
generation; in the second set of columns variables are individual-level for the 3rd generation and family-level for 
previous generations; and in the third set of columns variables are individual-level for the 4th generation and 
family-level for previous generations. 
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Online Appendix Table 3: Top percentile group regressions, alternative cutoffs 
 2nd generation  3rd generation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Top five percent 
Parents 0.226***  0.349***  0.332*** 
 (0.0585)  (0.0638)  (0.0627) 
Grandparents    0.133*** 0.0529 
    (0.0458) (0.0383) 
R2 0.062  0.131 0.047 0.144 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
 Panel B: Top 15 percent 
Parents 0.192***  0.321***  0.306*** 
 (0.0360)  (0.0374)  (0.0384) 
Grandparents    0.151*** 0.0831*** 
    (0.0318) (0.0302) 
R2 0.057  0.121 0.045 0.137 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. All variables are dummy variables equal to one for 
individuals in the top of the wealth distribution within their birth cohort group, and zero otherwise. tax-register 
wealth for parents and grandparents. In panel A, the dummies indicate the top five percent, and in panel B, they 
indicate the top 15 percent. All regressions include birth cohort group dummies for all generations.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Online Appendix Table 4: Wealth regressions, three-generation panel 
 2nd generation  3rd generation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Parents 0.292***  0.390***  0.388*** 
 (0.037)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Grandparents    0.136*** 0.040 
    (0.033) (0.031) 
R2 0.079  0.171 0.046 0.187 
N 920  1939 1939 1939 
Notes: The sample is restricted to only include families where we have wealth observations on all three genera-
tions. In column 1, only individuals who have children with observed wealth in the 3rd generation are included, 
and in columns 2-4, only individuals who have a parent in the index generation with observed wealth, as well as 
grandparents with observed wealth, are included. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. De-
pendent variable is 2nd generation tax-register wealth in column 1, and 3rd generation tax-register wealth in 
columns 2-4. Explanatory variables are tax-register wealth for parents and grandparents. All wealth variables are 
percentile ranked within birth cohort groups, and all regressions include birth cohort group dummies for all gen-
erations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online Appendix Table 5: Wealth regressions, IHS and log transformed 
 2nd generation  3rd generation 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: IHS wealth 
Parents 0.221***  0.267***  0.256*** 
 (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Grandparents    0.150*** 0.082* 
    (0.048) (0.048) 
R2 0.033  0.043 0.018 0.051 
 Panel B: IHS wealth; Adding 10 to all with zero wealth 
Parents 0.291***  0.268***  0.257*** 
 (0.048)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
Grandparents    0.199*** 0.112* 
    (0.063) (0.064) 
R2 0.033  0.042 0.018 0.051 
 Panel C: IHS wealth; Adding 1000 to all with zero wealth  
Parents 0.538***  0.265***  0.252*** 
 (0.090)  (0.037)  (0.038) 
Grandparents    0.386*** 0.234** 
    (0.119) (0.119) 
R2 0.032  0.041 0.019 0.049 
N 1147  2100 2100 2100 
 Panel D: Log wealth 
Parents 0.175***  0.384***  0.318*** 
 (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.056) 
Grandparents    0.244*** 0.168*** 
    (0.047) (0.047) 
R2 0.072  0.119 0.082 0.153 
N 415  571 571 571 
 Panel E: Ranked wealth, log sample (Panel D) 
Parents 0.313***  0.289***  0.275*** 
 (0.094)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
Grandparents    0.345*** 0.192** 
    (0.079) (0.083) 
R2 0.063  0.177 0.111 0.228 
N 415  571 571 571 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth in column 1, and 3rd generation tax-register wealth in columns 2-4. Explanatory variables are tax-register 
wealth for parents and grandparents. Wealth variables are inverse hyperbolic sine transformed in panels A-C. In 
panel B, 10 has been added to all zeroes in 1st generation wealth before transforming, and in panel C 1000 has 
been added. In panel D, all wealth variables are log transformed, and panel E shows percentile rank regressions 
for the same sample as the log regressions in panel D. All regressions include quadratic birth year controls for 
both generations in panels A-D, and birth cohort group dummies of all generations in panel E. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online Appendix Table 6: Imputed regressions, sensitivity analysis 
 (1) (2) 
 Censored Imputed 
Parents 0.441*** 0.386*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) 
N 2100 2094 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 3rd generation tax-register 
wealth. Explanatory variables are tax-register wealth for parents. In column 1 parental wealth has been artificial-
ly censored to mimic the censoring in 1st generation wealth, and in column 2 the censored values have been 
imputed (see text for details). All wealth variables are percentile ranked within birth cohort groups, and all re-
gressions include birth cohort group dummies for both generations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Online Appendix Table 7: Wealth regressions at younger ages 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Parents 0.261***  0.242*** 
 (0.026)  (0.027) 
Grandparents  0.154*** 0.080*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
R2 0.080 0.040 0.099 
N 2099 2099 2099 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 3rd generation tax-register 
wealth measured in 1985, 1988, and 1991, so that these individuals are around age 30 when their wealth is 
measured. Explanatory variables are tax-register wealth for parents and grandparents. All wealth variables are 
percentile ranked within birth cohort groups, and all regressions include birth cohort group dummies of all gen-
erations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Online Appendix Table 8: Controlling for inheritance fractional polynomial 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parents' wealth 0.251*** 0.0912** 0.0894** 0.0753* 
 (0.0393) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0453) 
Polynomial terms 0 1 2 3 
R2 0.079 0.140 0.141 0.146 
N 809 809 809 809 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is percentile ranked 2nd generation 
1991 tax-register wealth. Explanatory variables are percentile ranked parental tax-register wealth and a fractional 
polynomial in average inheritance received. All regressions include birth cohort group dummies for both genera-
tions and a quadratic in average parental year of death. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online appendix table 9: Inheritance regressions, sensitivity analyses 
 One or two parents bequeathing  Two parents bequeathing 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Bottom-censored inheritance 
Parents' wealth  0.262*** 0.121***   0.310*** 0.151** 
  (0.039) (0.044)   (0.054) (0.067) 
Inheritance 0.349***  0.279***  0.346***  0.249*** 
 (0.037)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.068) 
R2 0.115 0.071 0.137  0.140 0.113 0.179 
 Panel B: Top decile inheritance regressions 
Parents' wealth  0.153*** 0.059   0.204*** 0.085 
  (0.045) (0.043)   (0.062) (0.065) 
Inheritance 0.245***  0.210***  0.212***  0.167*** 
 (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.055) 
R2 0.087 0.047 0.108  0.144 0.101 0.184 
N 809 809 809  386 386 386 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth. Explanatory variables are tax-register wealth for parents and total inheritance received from parents. In 
panel A, inheritance has been censored by setting the lowest values to zero, to mimic the censoring in parental 
wealth. Parents’ wealth has been percentile ranked within birth cohort groups, and average inheritance has been 
percentile ranked within parental year of death groups. In panel B, all wealth and inheritance variables are dum-
my variables equal to one for individuals in the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution within their birth cohort 
(year of death for inheritances) group, and zero otherwise. All regressions include birth and death cohort group 
dummies corresponding to the included variables. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online appendix table 10: Inheritance regressions, CPI and GDP adjusted 
 Main  Only two inheritances 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 CPI GDP  CPI GDP 
Parents' wealth 0.043 -0.061  0.031 -0.089 
 (0.042) (0.042)  (0.061) (0.062) 
R2 0.009 0.014  0.033 0.037 
N 809 809  386 386 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Outcome variable is child wealth excluding inher-
itance, calculated as the sum of received inheritances that have been adjusted for inflation (column 1) or eco-
nomic growth (column 2). In columns 3-4, only those who have received inheritances from both parents are 
included. All regressions include birth cohort group dummies for both generations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online Appendix Table 11: Mediating variables regressions, child's wealth purged from inher-
itance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parents' wealth 0.018 -0.005 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Parents' earnings  0.017  -0.006 
  (0.041)  (0.042) 
Parents' schooling   0.020 0.020 
   (0.043) (0.044) 
Own earnings  0.161***  0.138*** 
  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Own schooling   0.118*** 0.071* 
   (0.040) (0.041) 
R2 0.012 0.063 0.052 0.068 
N 782 782 782 782 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 2nd generation tax-register 
wealth purged from inheritances using the specification in column 3 of Table 6. Explanatory variables are par-
ents’ tax-register wealth, earnings, and schooling, and own earnings and schooling. All wealth variables are 
percentile ranked within birth cohort groups. Earnings is percentile ranked lifetime earnings, and schooling is 
percentile ranked years of completed schooling. All regressions include birth cohort group dummies for all in-
cluded generations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online Appendix Table 12: 3rd generation mediating variables regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wealth Earnings Schooling Wealth Wealth Wealth 
 Panel A: Regressions of 3rd generation on parents 
Parents' wealth 0.395***   0.320*** 0.330*** 0.300*** 
 (0.021)   (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Parents' earnings  0.234***  0.031  0.013 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.024) 
Parents' schooling   0.390***  0.005 -0.005 
   (0.021)  (0.023) (0.022) 
Own earnings    0.259***  0.226*** 
    (0.020)  (0.021) 
Own schooling     0.194*** 0.116*** 
     (0.022) (0.023) 
R2 0.171 0.072 0.172 0.238 0.204 0.247 
N 2490 2490 2490 2490 2490 2490 
 Panel B: Regressions of 3rd generation on grandparents 
Grandparents' wealth 0.170***   0.087*** 0.116*** 0.079*** 
 (0.032)   (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Grandparents' earnings  0.144***  0.086***  0.062** 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
Grandparents' schooling   0.189***  0.020 -0.010 
   (0.028)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Own earnings    0.313***  0.244*** 
    (0.022)  (0.024) 
Own schooling     0.298*** 0.199*** 
     (0.024) (0.026) 
R2 0.047 0.048 0.062 0.160 0.137 0.190 
N 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
 Panel C: Regressions of 3rd generation on parents and grand-
parents 
Parents' wealth 0.395***   0.322*** 0.336*** 0.304*** 
 (0.026)   (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Grandparents' wealth 0.036   -0.002 0.023 0.004 
 (0.031)   (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Parents' earnings  0.209***  0.050*  0.033 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028) 
Grandparents' earnings  0.097***  0.036  0.033 
  (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Parents' schooling   0.367***  -0.002 -0.017 
   (0.026)  (0.026) (0.026) 
Grandparents' schooling   0.074***  -0.007 -0.022 
   (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) 
Own earnings    0.248***  0.211*** 
    (0.022)  (0.024) 
Own schooling     0.211*** 0.132*** 
     (0.026) (0.027) 
R2 0.193 0.094 0.196 0.263 0.237 0.275 
N 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on family. Dependent variable is 3rd generation tax-register 
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wealth in columns 1 and 3-6, earnings in column 2, and schooling in column 3. Explanatory variables are tax-
register wealth, earnings, and schooling for parents and grandparents, and own earnings and schooling. All 
wealth variables are percentile ranked within birth cohort groups. Earnings is percentile ranked lifetime earnings, 
and schooling is percentile ranked years of completed schooling. All regressions include birth cohort group 
dummies for all included generations. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Online Appendix Figure 1: Kernel regressions, alternative measures for 1st generation 
Notes: Solid lines show results from bivariate local linear kernel regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel and 
0.12 bandwidth. The x axis shows ancestors’ wealth percentile rank, and the y axis shows descendants’ wealth 
percentile rank. The variables have been residualized by regressing out birth cohort dummies for both genera-
tions, and the residuals have been rescaled to have the same range as the original percentile ranked variables. 
Dashed lines show best linear fits, and the vertical lines along the bottom show the distribution of observations 
across. The first row repeats results from Figure 1 for reference, while subsequent rows show results correspond-
ing to columns 1 and 3 in Table 3. 
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Online Appendix Figure 2: Purged inheritance kernel regressions 
Notes: Lines show results from bivariate local linear kernel regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel and 0.2 
bandwidth. The x axis shows parents’ wealth percentile rank, and the y axis shows children’s wealth percentile 
rank. Dependent variable is wealth for the solid line, and wealth net of inheritance for the dashed line, corre-
sponds to columns 1 and 3 of Table 6, panel B. The variables have been residualized by regressing out birth 
cohort dummies for both generations, and the residuals have been rescaled to have the same range as the original 
percentile ranked variables.  
 
 
 
